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Throughout this century, international law has focused on eliminating
the use of force from interstate relations. In 1928, the signatories of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact renounced war "as an instrument of national policy
in their relations with one another,"' and seventeen years later, hoping
"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," 2 states
pledged to abide by article "2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which
prohibits the threat or use of force. The Charter's prohibition, however,
is not absolute: it expressly permits state uses of force for self-defense 3
and for U.N. purposes.4 These exceptions to the rule have provided and
continue to provide legal cover (with varying persuasive power) for state
recourse to violence. Instead of relying on these explicit exceptions, how-
ever, the Soviet Union has looked outside the U.N. Charter to justify its
apparent violations of article 2(4). Soviet international law theorists ar-
gue that the October Revolution and the emergence of other socialist
states have irrevocably altered the system of international relations5 and,
t M.A., Yale University, 1988.
1. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27,
1928, art. 1, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
2. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
3. Id. art. 51. The diplomatic exchanges leading up to ratification of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact imply that self-defense is protected by customary law and not limitable by conventional
law: "There is nothing in the American draft of an antiwar treaty which restricts or impairs in
any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit
in every treaty." U.S. Note, June 23, 1928, reprinted in 243 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
60, 61 (1928).
4. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
5. "[The development of international law after the Great October Socialist Revolution
has been dominated by the international legal ideas and principles of this revolution." Tunkin,
International Law in the International System, 147 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 28 (1975).
"L'existence de cet [Soviet] Etat et sa participation aux relations internationales changrent le
caract~re du droit international en accentuant les tendances d6mocratiques qui s'y trouvaient
en germe et en y introduisant de nouveaux principes socialistes." Krylov, Les Notions
Principales du droit des Gens, 70 RECUEIL DES COURs 415, 422 (1947).
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since World War II, introduced into international law a socialist sub-
system based on the principles of socialist internationalism.
Following an overview of the historical antecedents and substance of
socialist internationalism, this Comment attempts to place the norms of
socialist internationalism within the broad context of the Soviet-Marxist
political and ethical doctrines that underlie Soviet notions of domestic
and international law. I demonstrate that socialist internationalism's de-
parture from Western international law mirrors the Soviet domestic law
rejection of Western conceptions of a priori natural law rights. The final
section examines recent developments under General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev and their impact on the norms of socialist internationalism.
I. Background of Socialist Internationalism
The bold promises of world revolution and the destruction of the state
system that accompanied the 1917 October Revolution faded within
weeks as the Bolsheviks adapted themselves to the realities of European
great-power politics. Calls for open diplomacy 6 and peace without an-
nexations or reparations 7 went unfulfilled as the Soviets began participat-
ing in the international arena on terms largely set by the Western
European powers in agreements such as the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. 8 Sub-
sequently, Soviet diplomatic activity intensified as the nation signed the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, joined the League of Nations (which the Soviets
had originally denounced), 9 and even agreed to honor certain pre-revolu-
tionary Russian debts.' 0
As the Soviets expanded their participation in established forms of in-
ternational relations, they recognized a need to reconcile this activity
with traditional Marxist doctrine. Korovin, the first to define in detail
the young state's position on international law, posited a transitional
phase during which Soviet participation in international law would infect
the bourgeois system with socialist norms which would eventually
6. See, e.g., Statement by Trotsky on the Publication of the Secret Treaties (Nov. 22,
1917), in SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY 8-9 (J. Degras ed. 1951).
7. See, e.g., The Decree on Peace (Nov. 8, 1917), in SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN
POLICY, supra note 6, at 1.
8. In the words of George Vernadsky, "The peace conditions [under the Brest-Litovsk
Treaty] were disastrous to Russia .... Russia lost 26 per cent of her total population; 27 per
cent of her arable land; 32 per cent of her average crops .... Besides that Russia had to pay a
large war indemnity." Quoted in N. RIASANOVSKY, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 529 (1977).
9. See Extract from Appeal for the Formation of the Communist International (Jan. 24,
1919), in SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 6, at 136.
10. V. KUBLKOVA & A. CRUIKSHANK, MARXISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 164
(1985).
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prevail over the established law.I1 Korovin considered intersystem inter-
action-and even cooperation-possible during the transitional period
because, although socialist legal norms rested on a different socio-eco-
nomic basis than capitalist norms, common ground existed for mutually
beneficial activities such as trade.12
Korovin's theories were soon eclipsed by those of E. B. Pashukanis,
the leading authority in all fields of Soviet legal theory from the mid-
1920s until his arrest in 1937. While Korovin maintained that interna-
tional law would change both its form and content under socialist pres-
sure, Pashukanis held that until socialism forced the elimination of law
completely, law's form was immutable. Abstracting from Marx's funda-
mental conception that the material, economic bases of a society deter-
mine its superstructure, Pashukanis developed a theory in which law's
form had an economic basis. 13 Legal systems, in his view, were a collec-
tion of exchanges designed to formalize and regulate society; even crimi-
nal law was viewed on the model of a contract governing exchanges
between juridically equal participants.1 4 Pashukanis contended that as
socialist society liberated itself from notions of individualism and as eco-
nomic relations developed beyond the stage of commodity exchange to
"from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," 15
law-like the state-would wither away.
Pashukanis applied his commodity-exchange theory to international
law much as he had to domestic law. For Pashukanis, the initial rise of
the Soviet state did not alter the form of international law, which still
operated on the basis of "normal diplomatic relations and contractual
exchange." 16 As socialism transcended the phase of commodity ex-
change and its contradictions, both domestically and worldwide, how-
ever, the need for institutions to resolve conflicts would die with the
conflicts themselves. Law would then wither away, replaced by adminis-
trative plans necessary merely to rationalize production. 17
11. E. KOROVIN, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO PEREKHODNOGE VREMENI 135 (1924).
12. V. KUBLKOVA & A. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 10, at 166.
13. W. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 32 (1983).
14. The notion of equivalence, this first purely juridic idea, always has its source in the
form of a commodity. A crime may be considered as a particular aspect of exchange, in
which the exchange (contractual relationship) is established post factum, that is, after the
intentional act of one of the parties. The ratio between the crime and the punishment is
reduced to an exchange ratio.
R. SHARLET & P. BEIRNE, PASHUKANIS: SELECTED WRITINGS 111 (P. Maggs trans. 1980).
15. Marx & Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER
485 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1978).
16. R. SHARLET & P. BEIRNE, supra note 14, at 173.




Pashukanis' theory of international law essentially presaged the plural-
ist conception of international law adopted by the Soviets in the late
1950s. 18 The Soviets, Pashukanis argued, should participate in the essen-
tially bourgeois construct of international law only to the extent their
interests dictated. He maintained throughout that, like domestic law and
the state, international law would ultimately fade away with the growth
of socialism.19
In 1937 the commodity-exchange theory, and Professor Pashukanis
himself, were abruptly discarded by Stalin, whose emphasis on such
state-aggrandizing concepts as "socialism in one country" and "capitalist
encirclement" rendered heretical all references to the withering away of
the Soviet state. Andrei Vyshinsky, whose theories replaced those of
Pashukanis, offered doctrines that amounted to little more than reaf-
firmations of Stalin's foreign policy goals. The principles of Stalinist in-
ternational law espoused by Vyshinsky included "struggle for dis-
armament, struggle against all forms of aggression... [and] rallying the
strength of progressive humanity in the struggle against fascism, reaction
and war."' 20 Rather than producing a new theory of international law, in
this period the Soviets merely reserved to themselves the right to reject
certain institutions of bourgeois international law: "The USSR does not
accept all institutions and models of bourgeois international law-it
openly rejects those which emerged as institutions for the enslavement of
small and weak peoples by the groups of imperialist governments. 21
18. The Soviets implicitly acknowledged Pashukanis' contribution by rehabilitating him in
1956. For a discussion of the revival of Pashukanis' theories in the 1950s, see Hazard,
Pashukanis Is No Traitor, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. 385 (1957). His view that the Soviet Union's
relations with capitalist countries should operate on the basis of "normal diplomatic relations
and contractual exchange," R. SHARLET & P. BEIRNE, supra note 14, at 173, can be consid-
ered a forerunner to the Soviet Union's later adoption of "peaceful coexistence." See infra text
accompanying notes 22-27. And, although during his lifetime the Soviet Union and Mongolia
were the only socialist countries, Pashukanis anticipated that a unique set of rules-later
known as soviet internationalism-would govern relations between socialist states. "The pro-
letarian states, not having merged formally into one federation or union, must present in their
mutual relationships an image of such close economic, political and military unity, that the
measure of 'modern' international law becomes inapplicable to them." R. SHARLETT & P.
BEIRNE, supra note 14, at 173.
19. The formalization of our relationships with bourgeois states, by way of treaties, is
part of our foreign policy, and is its continuation in a special form. A treaty obligation is
nothing other than a special form of the concretization of economic and political relation-
ships. But once the appropriate degree of concretization is reached, it may then be taken
into consideration, and, within certain limits, studied as a special subject [i.e. international
law]. The reality of this object is no less than the reality of any constitution-both may be
overturned by the intrusion of a revolutionary squall.
Id. at 181.
20. Tezysy po Mezhgunarodnomu pravu, 1938:5 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVE 121 (Vyshin-
sky is generally accepted as the author of this piece).
21. Id.
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Following the stagnant Vyshinsky period, changed circumstances
abroad and Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign combined to moder-
ate and, to some extent, clarify Soviet international law doctrine. Under
General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet theorists eventually settled
on a pluralist conception of international law which held that within
"general international law" two different sets of norms govern. Socialist,
or proletarian, internationalism controls relations among socialist coun-
tries, while peaceful coexistence governs the competition between the op-
posed capitalist and socialist systems.
Both peaceful coexistence and socialist internationalism double as
political doctrines;22 as such they include many normative elements that
do not apply as principles of international law. Since Khrushchev's 1956
declaration that war between the United States and the Soviet Union was
not inevitable, 23 the actual principles of peaceful coexistence have varied
over time.24 As enumerated by Grigory Tunkin in 1975, peaceful coexis-
tence includes renunciation of the threat or use of force or policies that
could lead to war; the obligation to cooperate with, respect, and recog-
nize states despite differences in socio-economic systems; and the obliga-
tion not to impose one's own socio-economic system on another with the
aid of force.25 The United States, at the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit,
formally agreed to conduct its relations with the Soviet Union "on the
basis of peaceful coexistence."' 26 The doctrine of peaceful coexistence has
had minimal effect on international law because the norms it embodies
essentially replicate principles already enunciated in the U.N. Charter.
27
Socialist internationalism, in contrast to peaceful coexistence, does
constitute a revolutionary departure from established international law.
Most importantly, socialist internationalism justifies, under its doctrine
22. "But the Soviet State proclaimed the principle of peaceful coexistence not only as a
principle of its foreign policy, but also as a legal principle of relations between States of differ-
ent socio-economic systems." Tunkin, supra note 5, at 27. "The main principle determining
the relations between socialist countries is the principle of socialist internationalism. This is
not only a political principle, but also a principle of international law." 0. Khestov, The New
Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, INT'L AFF., July 1970, at 9, 12.
23. Hazard, supra note 18, at 388.
24. As early as 1965, Leon Lipson, in searching for an enunciation of the principles of
peaceful coexistence, noted: "It is not hard to find a list; the hard thing is to find which list to
use." Lipson, Peaceful Coexistence, in THE SOVIET IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (H.
Baade ed. 1965).
25. Tunkin, supra note 5, at 39.
26. "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the USSR and USA," cited in
Yermoshkin, Peaceful Coexistence: A Universal Norm of International Relations, INT'L AFF.,
June 1987, at 75.
27. Lipson, The Rise and Fall of "Peaceful Coexistence" in International Law, in 1 PAPERS
ON SOVIET LAW 6 (L. Lipson & V. Chaldize eds. 1977). Tunkin has acknowledged that peace-
ful coexistence does not depart from the norms of the U.N. Charter. Tunkin, Sozdanie sistemy




of fraternal assistance, uses of force to defend the interests of world so-
cialism.28 Tunkin attributes the origins of socialist internationalism to
the principles guiding the international workers' movement in the 19th
century;29 its status as a legal doctrine, however, only became relevant
with the emergence of socialist nations in Eastern Europe and the for-
malization of relations within the Eastern bloc through documents such
as the Warsaw Pact 30 and the Charter of the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance.31
On a simplistic level, the West can view socialist internationalism as a
geopolitical justification for uses of force. However, I contend that the
socialist perception of the role of individual states in the bloc mirrors the
Marxist understanding of the role of individuals in society. In fact, so-
cialist internationalism represents an effort by the Soviets to introduce
certain norms applied domestically to Soviet citizens into the realm of
international relations between socialist states. 32 Part II traces these
norms to Soviet law treatment of individuals and to the Marxist precepts
that inform that law.
28. Tunkin outlines the tenets of this doctrine as follows:
The principle of socialist internationalism is a very broad principle, meaning above all
close cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance of socialist States. At the same time this
principle requires that co-operation among socialist States be developed on the basis of
principles of respect for sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mu-
tual benefit.
Tunkin, supra note 5, at 107.
29. Id. at 24.
30. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact), May 14,
1975, 219 U.N.T.S. 3.
3 . Charter of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Dec. 14, 1959, 368 U.N.T.S.
253.
32. The model of intervention advanced by socialist internationalism differs substantially
from the justifications typically presented by Western countries in that it imports, from outside
the U.N. Charter, the norms by which it legitimates intervention. For example, Soviet state-
ments defending the use of force in Czechoslovakia justified the action as a response to "the
threat which has arisen to the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, and to the statehood estab-
lished by the [Czechoslovakian Socialist] Constitution." Tass Statement on Military Interven-
tion, 7 I.L.M. 1283 (1968). The Brezhnev Doctrine, the theoretical justification for the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia, dismisses self-determination as too laden with class prejudice to
serve as a useful norm in this situation: "The formal observance of freedom of self-determina-
tion in the specific situation that had taken shape in Czechoslovakia would signify freedom of
'self-determination' not for the people's masses and the working people, but for their enemies."
Kovalev, Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries, Pravda, Sept. 26,
1968, trans. in 20 CDSP, No. 39, at 11. Paradoxically, Kovalev described the invasion of
Czechoslovakia as enhancing self-determination by allowing the Czechoslovak people to de-
cide their destiny "without intimidation by counterrevolutionaries, without revisionist and na-
tionalist demagoguery." Id.
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II. The Socialist Domestic Analogy
In the absence of international law, relations between sovereign states
would be anarchic; since uses of force would be unregulated, states would
have "an unqualified prerogative.., to resort to war."' 33 In contrast to
this model, in which states unilaterally evaluate the need for and legality
of force, the traditional system of international law is based on a domes-
tic analogy which demands that uses of force between states strictly con-
form to rules of law. In domestic society, the government reserves for
itself a monopoly on the use of violence; in the absence of a supranational
authority, international law relies on states to monitor legal obligations
and impose sanctions against other nations, if necessary through uses of
force. Under the domestic analogy, a use of force is legitimate only if it
enforces an internationally accepted legal right.34
Apart from the self-evident appeal of transposing the tranquility asso-
ciated with a community ruled by law to the sphere of interstate rela-
tions, the domestic analogy also draws strength from the historical
memory ii Europe of the "theoretical imperium of Pope and Emperor
and the actual imperium of Rome."' 35 Consciousness of these ambitious
systems of order together with the shadow cast by subsequent periods of
discord culminating in World War I led many in the 20th century to
adopt a model of international law organized around the domestic
analogy.
In his book Just and Unjust Wars, political theorist Michael Walzer
outlines a code of morality for nations considering war and details rules
for conducting war justly.36 His "legalist paradigm" serves as a useful
point of departure because it attempts to bridge the philosophical heri-
tage of the Grotian just war theory37 to the fundamental concerns of
contemporary Western international law for state sovereignty. The
33. Bull, Society and Anarchy in International Relations, in DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATIONS
35, 37 (H. Butterfield & M. Wright eds. 1966).
34. According to Francisco de Vitoria, "There is a single and only just cause for commenc-
ing a war, namely, a wrong received." F. VITORIA, ON THE LAW OF WAR (J. Pawley trans.
1917), quoted in M. WALZER, JusT AND UNJUST WARS 62 (1977). "A 'legitimate' use of
violence, then, is one in which the act has been authorized as a means of securing or enforcing
a legal right." Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua
v. United States and the Development of International Law, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 32 (1987).
35. Bull, supra note 33, at 37.
36. M. WALZER, supra note 34, at 127-224.
37. In Grotius' conception of international society, all interstate uses of force are consid-
ered unjust unless undertaken to enforce a legal right. Although the make-up of these rights
has changed since Grotius' time, see Bull, The Grotian Conception of International Society, in
DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 33, at 55, Grotius' central contribution remains
widely accepted: violence can serve as a mechanism to enforce established legal rights, but it is
illegitimate to use force to alter the legal regime itself. Id. at 54-55.
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paradigm's essential idea-that "if states actually do possess rights more
or less as individuals do, then it is possible to imagine a society among
them more or less like the society of individuals" 38-assumes that indi-
viduals are naturally endowed with a set of inalienable rights. When the
domestic analogy replaces individuals with states, Walzer specifies sover-
eignty and territorial integrity as the most critical rights of states. These
concerns, a central feature of 20th century international law's quest to
outlaw the use of force, form the basis of the legalist paradigm:
1. There exists an international society of independent states ... 2.... This
international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members-
above all.., territorial integrity and political sovereignty.... 3.... Any use
offorce or imminent use or imminent threat offorce by one state against the
political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression
and is a criminal act.... 5.... Nothing but aggression can justify war.
39
Thus Walzer's paradigm uses a natural law-based civil order and the do-
mestic analogy to postulate an international society that upholds the
rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. But what if the
domestic analogue upon which one bases a conception of international
law is founded on something other than natural law? I argue that
although a faithful analogue of Soviet domestic law, socialist internation-
alism differs from the Western domestic analogy. The Soviet conception
of law does not derive from natural law but is instead guided by a Marx-
ist weltanschauung that makes rights contingent on their contribution to
society's development. If, as Walzer writes, "[t]he comparison of inter-
national to civil order is crucial to the theory of aggression,"'4 then an
analysis of the Soviet domestic order ought to signal that its notions of
individual rights and, by implication, state sovereignty and uses of force
are likely to diverge from the prevailing Western models.
A. The Marxist Foundation of Soviet Ethics
The fundamental differences between Marxist and Western concep-
tions of legal rights concern how they view the relationship of their socie-
ties to time and how they conceive of the interplay between individual
and collective interests. The Western schema views individuals as en-
dowed with rights inviolable by other people or the government through
all time. John Locke writes:
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone;
and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it
38. M. WALZER, supra note 34, at 58.
39. Id. at 61-62 (emphasis in original).
40. IH at 58.
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that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his
life, health, liberty, or possessions.
41
Proponents of a natural law basis for government demarcate a line divid-
ing individual and collective interests. John Stuart Mill notes, "There is
a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual,
has, if any, only an indirect interest."
'42
In the Marxist view, the continual changes in the material forces of
production perpetually change man and his needs.43 Marxist and Soviet
theories reject the notion of natural law, and instead affirm that human
rights derive
not from the "nature" of man but from the position of an individual in the
society and, above all, in the process of public production. It proceeds from
the premise that social opportunities and rights are not inherent in the na-
ture of man and do not constitute some sort of natural attributes.
44
Although men are not vested with natural rights, Marx argues that
man's existence as an "object-creating being" 45 dictates man's social
character. According to Marx,
The social character is the universal character of the whole movement; as
society itself produces man as man, so it is produced by him. . . The
human significance of nature only exists for social man, because only in this
case is nature a bond with other men, the basis of his existence for others
and of their existence for him. Only then is nature the basis of his own
human experience and a vital element of human reality.
46
Hence human nature dictates that men are universally dependent upon
one another; there is, however, no natural law that protects an individ-
ual's private interests with respect to the collective. In fact, under the
Marxist conception, collectives embody the interests of all their members
41. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT para. 5, at 6 (Peardon ed. 1986).
42. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15-16 (C. Shields ed. 1956). Marcuse maintains that property
rights are inseparable from the right to privacy:
[Fireedom, according to the Western conception, is a function of privacy, and privacy is
linked to property-as the institution through which the person is legally constituted as
having a realm of his own. Freedom of thought and conscience requires freedom from
interference with matters which belong to the individual and not to the state and society.
H. MARCUSE, SOVIET MARXISM 196 (1961) (emphasis in original).
43. In pre-communist society, for example, religion arises in response to man's need for
spiritual identification in light of his imperfect understanding. See Marx, The German Ideol-
ogy, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER, supra note 15, at 154-55. And during the capitalist
epoch, man's need for money as a means to survival is wholly contingent upon the exchange
relations specific to that historical phase. See K. MARX, EARLY WRITINGS 168 (T. Bottomore
trans. 1963).
44. Kartashkin, The Socialist Countries and Human Rights, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 631 (K. Vasek ed. 1982).
45. S. AVINERI, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF KARL MARX 86 (1969).
46. K. MARX, supra note 43, at 157 (emphasis in original).
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and the perceived dichotomy between the group and the individual
ceases to exist. 47
This attempt to transcend the barrier between public and private
realms eliminates such natural law rights as the right to hold property.
Marx's rhetorical antipathy to private property48 has a firm basis in his
theory of history, which views the advent of private property as one as-
pect of man's alienation from his labor-power and the collective. 49 The
"positive abolition of private property" accompanying the socialist
revolution thus represents the "return of man himself as a social, i.e.
really human, being."' 50 Thus the appropriation of property and the limi-
tations on other individual freedoms are, in their original formulation by
Marx, not part of a political strategy but the liberating consequences of
historical development.
Marx views historical progress--culminating in communism-as the
precondition for man to realize his nature as a social being. As the mov-
ing force of historical progress, man is characterized by the "principle of
motion ... the essential power of man striving energetically for its ob-
ject." 5' As individuals and societies advance through time, they encoun-
ter unique conditions at every step; a rigid, static legal system blind to
the laws of history would only impede social progress. Conscious of this,
the Soviet legal system evolved with a dual purpose: to facilitate dispute
resolution and the orderly functioning of society on the one hand and to
realize the community's historical destiny to build communism on the
other. The Preamble to the Soviet Constitution expresses the Soviet
state's teleological self-perception: "The supreme goal of the Soviet State
is the building of a classless communist society in which public commu-
nist self-government will receive development."'52 The state's role as
47. "It is above all necessary to avoid postulating 'society' once again as an obstruction
confronting the individual. The individual is the social being." Id. at 158.
48. "[T]he theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition
of private property." Marx & Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in THE MARX-
ENGELS READER, supra note 15, at 485.
49. K. MARX, supra note 43, at 133-34.
50. Id. at 155. Earlier, Jean-Jacques Rousseau had also expressed the idea that unfettered
use of property was not in society's best interests: "[T]he right of any individual over his own
estate is always subordinate to the right of the community over everything; for without this
there would be neither strength in the social bond nor effective force in the excercise of sover-
eignty." J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 68 (M. Cranston trans. 1968).
51. Quoted in E. FROMM, MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN 30 (1971) (quoting Karl Marx).
52. KONST. SSSR preamble (emphasis in original). The transcendental goals of state so-
cialism contrast sharply with the classic natural law role of government as enunciated by the
French National Assembly in 1789: "The end of all political associations is the preservation of
the natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security, and
resistance of oppression." Quoted in T. PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 132 (H. Collins ed. 1969)
(emphasis in original).
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catalyst for historical progress rather than guardian of natural rights
gives the Soviet state a unique sense of mission and subordinates law (in
the reactive, Western sense) to the needs of the mission (law writ large).5 3
More concretely, Soviet law must be flexible enough to accommodate the
changing needs of the community. Soviet ethics and the Soviet concep-
tion of justice provide insight into the legal doctrines governing individ-
ual rights in the U.S.S.R.
Although Marx proclaimed his theory of history to be ethically neu-
tral,54 it is in fact inherently biased toward accommodating "historical
progress": the ddnouement of the class struggle is implicitly regarded as
the morally preferable outcome. This immanent morality relates exclu-
sively to the end goals of the class struggle; in the interim, the rejection of
natural law rights governs. This denial of inherent rights exposes society
to potentially harmful methods of achieving the desired ends: "Marxism
has an inspiring moral vision, but no developed theory of moral con-
straints, of what means are permissible in the pursuit of its ends."
55
B. The Soviet Legal System-Domestic and International
1. Individual Rights Under Soviet Law
The Soviets have clearly sought to create a code of ethics that legiti-
mates socialist objectives and the peculiar means the Soviet Union has
adopted in pursuit of them.56 Law serves as a potent force in seeking
53. Hannah Arendt writes:
The tremendous intellectual change which took place in the middle of the last century
consisted in the refusal to view or accept anything "as it is" and in the consistent interpre-
tation of everything as being only a stage of some further development. Whether the
driving force of this development was called nature or history is relatively secondary. In
these ideologies the term "law" itself changed its meaning: from expressing the frame-
work of stability within which human actions and motions can take place, it became the
expression of the motion itself.
H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 464 (1966).
54. Marx hoped to create a theory grounded on scientific, rather than ethical, foundations;
the rise of communist and socialist outlooks, he argued, "shattered the basis of all morality,
whether the morality of asceticism or of enjoyment." K. MARX & F. ENGELS, THE GERMAN
IDEOLOGY 115 (C.J. Arthur ed. 1970). A critic sympathetic to the moral implications of
Marxist doctrine also accepts its amoral status: "[Marx] describes an outlook for politics that
is decent without being moral." R. MILLER, ANALYZING MARX 97 (1984).
55. Lukes, morals, in A DIcTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT 341, 342 (T. Bottomore ed.
1983).
56. Lenin stated the essence of Soviet morality as follows: "[M]orality is what serves to
destroy the old exploiting society and to unite all the working people around the proletariat,
which is building up a new, a communist society." Speech at 3rd Komsomol Congress, 1920,
quoted in Fetscher, ethics, in id. at 154. Marcuse terms this "the instrumentalization of Soviet
ethics." H. MARCUSE, supra note 42, at 198. "[T]hroughout all changes to which Soviet
ethical theories have been subjected since the Bolshevik Revolution, they have been governed
by one unifying principle, namely, the formulation and evaluation of ethical standards in ac-
cordance with the objectives of the Soviet state." Id. at 181.
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these ends. The Soviet system of justice conforms to what Mirjan
Dama~ka describes as an activist state,57 which uses the administration of
justice to implement policy. A reactive state, on the other hand, uses the
justice system primarily to resolve disputes between its citizens.58 The
activist characteristics of the Soviet justice system manifest themselves in
substantive criminal laws that subordinate individual rights to state inter-
ests and in procedural regulations that grant tremendous judicial discre-
tion to such officials as the state procurator.
The Soviets justify the apparent denial of individual rights by assuming
that the socialist state reflects the true interests of society,59 even if it
conflicts with the perceived interests of its individual members. This rea-
soning follows from the proposition that the Soviet state is not founded
on a ruling class distinct socially or economically from the population at
large; since the Soviet state is "a state of all the people,"' 60 it is able to
resolve conflicts between individual and collective interests and ulti-
mately succeed-as Marx predicted-in rendering the private-public du-
ality obsolete.
In balancing individual rights with the interests of the collective,
which are assumed to be perfectly represented by the state, political
rights are always qualified by collective goals in Soviet law. The Soviet
definition of crime is itself laden with the primacy of state interests:
A socially dangerous act (an action or omission to act) infringing the Soviet
social or state system, socialist system of the economy, socialist ownership,
the person, political, labor, property, and other rights of citizens, and also
any other socially dangerous act infringing the socialist legal order which is
provided for by a criminal law, shall be deemed a crime.
61
Similarly, the Constitution's protection of free speech does not insulate a
Soviet citizen from criminal prosecution for utterances inconsistent with
state interests. Article 50 reads, "In accordance with the people's interests
57. In the legal process of the reactive state, decisions are justified more in terms of the
fairness of procedures employed than the accuracy of results obtained. In contrast, proce-
dural rules and regulations in an activist state occupy a much less important and in-
dependent position: procedure is basically a handmaiden of substantive law. If the
purpose of the legal process is to realize state policy in contingent cases, decisions are
legitimized primarily in terms of the correct outcomes they embody.
M. DAMA§KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 148 (1986).
58. Damalka summarizes different types of justice systems as follows: "Where govern-
ment is conceived as a manager, the administration of justice appears to be devoted to fulfill-
ment of state programs and implementation of state policies. In contrast, where government
merely maintains the social equilibrium, the administration of justice tends to be associated
with conflict resolution." Id. at 11.
59. KONST. SSSR art. 1.
60. Id. preamble.
61. Fundamental Principles of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics,
section II, art. 7, reprinted in COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC AND CONSTITUENT UNION REPUBLICS (W. Butler trans. 1983).
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and for the purpose of strengthening and developing the socialist system,
USSR citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, of assem-
bly, of mass meetings, and of street processions and demonstrations.
' 62
These examples demonstrate the dual role of law in a society advancing
toward communism: it strives to insure order while allowing political
leaders flexibility in promoting historical progress. Referring to the So-
viet Constitution, Robert Sharlet writes, "The result is a Soviet-style
Rechtsstaat, a legal framework through which the party can govern its
vast domain without irrevocably limiting its ultimate power of action."
'63
The Soviet concept of justice emphasizes substantive results more than
strict adherence to rules of procedure. As a consequence, the legal struc-
ture, combining flexible procedural rules with broad statutes protecting
state interests, magnifies the discretionary powers of the administrators
of justice. The rules invest great authority in state procurators, formally
charged with the duty to "enforce legality and exercise supervision.""
The procuracy constitutes an effective way for the Soviet administration
of justice to protect state interests and further the policy objectives of the
Communist Party.65 The state procurators hold the power to initiate and
terminate criminal proceedings, 66 to conduct preliminary investigations
independent of defense counsel, 67 to issue arrest warrants, 68 and to deter-
mine the legality of administrative detention and judge appeals of detain-
ees.69 With these powers of investigation, preliminary guilt deter-
mination, and prosecution, the procurator is "the single most important
official operating within the Soviet criminal justice system."'70 Thus the
62. KONST. SSSR art. 50 (emphasis added); see also id. art. 51: "In accordance with the
goals of communist construction, USSR citizens have the right to unite in public organizations
that facilitate the development of political activeness and initiative and the satisfaction of their
diverse interests." (Emphasis added). In a socialist society, Kartashkin writes,
The freedom of the individual is understood as freedom of man in a society, State, collec-
tivity, and not as freedom from them. Man lives in a certain collectivity, and he cannot be
fully independent of it. Therefore, everyone should compare his behaviour with the inter-
ests and requirements of the whole society.
Kartashkin, The Socialist Countries and Human Rights, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 633 (K. Vasek ed. 1982).
63. R. SHARLET, THE NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION OF 1977, at 56 (1978).
64. W. BUTLER, supra note 13, at 161.
65. Although Damalka maintains that every system of justice executes both policy-imple-
mentation and conflict resolution functions, "in pronouncedly managerial states such as China
or the Soviet Union, one should expect a heavy layer of policy implementing characteristics in
all spheres of the administration of justice." M. DAMA§KA, supra note 57, at 12.
66. LAW OF THE PROCURACY OF THE U.S.S.R., art. 29(11), reprinted in W. BUTLER,
supra note 61.
67. Id. art. 28.
68. Id art. 24(11).
69. Id art. 45.




procurators are well-positioned to advance state interests of policy imple-
mentation at the expense of individual rights in legal proceedings.
Since the administration of justice serves to promote state interests, the
Communist Party influences the process of justice in both formal and
informal ways. Formally, the Constitution declares that "[t]he Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union is the leading and guiding force of Soviet
society, the nucleus of its political system and of state and public organi-
zations. ' 71 Informally, administrators of justice are frequently members
of the Party; ninety percent of all procurators, for example, are Party
members.72 In addition to Party membership, which requires little active
participation, procurators frequently have experience working as full-
time salaried employees in the Party apparat in Moscow. The legal and
informal connections linking the Party, the state; and the procuracy as-
sure that the political leadership can manipulate the administration of
justice to achieve its desired results.
73
The Soviet Union's alignment of state power against the individual
often results in the denial of human rights.74 The organs of justice have
consistently adopted a broad interpretation of state interests and used it
as the justification for prosecuting countless political opponents. Dis-
cussing freedom of expression in the Soviet Union, Amnesty Interna-
tional concludes that "virtually any unauthorized criticism of official
actions or policy may lead to imprisonment. ' 75 Thus, individual rights
in the Soviet Union are circumscribed by a combination of procedural
71. KONST. SSSR art. 6.
72. W. BUTLER, supra note 13, at 161.
73. George Ginsburgs describes the juridical division of labor as follows: "Thus, a combi-
nation is improvised with the courts ostensibly protecting the individual's rights, while the
procuracy as the Party's privy councillor stands ever ready to steer the inquiries into the
proper channels by nominally legal means in compliance with its patron's will." Ginsburgs,
The Political Undercurrents of the Legal Debate, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1226, 1229 (1968).
Damalka writes that in activist polities, "[i]t follows that state adjudicators must also be com-
mitted to the state: an umpire's indifference toward governmental policies is out of place, even
reprehensible." M. DAMA§KA, supra note 57, at 72.
74. The most widely accepted codification of human rights is the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948),
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1, U.N.
Doc. ST/HR/i/Rev. 2 (1983). For an examination of the Soviet Union's violation of the
Declaration's article 9 right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, see AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE U.S.S.R. 65 (1980); for violation of the
article 10 right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, see
Ginsburgs, supra note 73; for violation of the article 18 right to freedom of religion, see AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra, at 42; for violation of the article 19 right to freedom of expres-
sion, see id. at 9-10; for violation of the article 20 right to freedom of association, see id. at 19-
20.
75. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 74, at 14"(1980).
319
Yale Journal of International Law
and substantive factors including the instrumental character of Soviet
ethics and the activist impulses of the justice system.76
2. State Rights Under Socialist Internationalism
In theory, and especially in practice, Soviet international law reflects
its domestic counterpart in the subordination of the perceived interests of
constituent members to the collective interests of the socialist system as
interpreted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In
both Soviet domestic and international law, the laws of class struggle and
the advance of socialism assume priority over respect for rights that may
impede or reverse historical progress. The Brezhnev Doctrine itself high-
lights the similarities between socialist internationalism and the aspects
of Soviet domestic law reviewed above. Kovalev, in the text that became
known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, refutes bourgeois criticisms of socialist
internationalism as overly formal and "untenable primarily because they
are based on an abstract, nonclass, approach to the question of sover-
eignty and the right of nations to self-determination. ' ' 77 In pursuing
socialist internationalism's theoretical goal of compliance with the "com-
mon natural laws of socialist construction, ' 78 the substantive goal of pro-
tecting socialism justifies the abridgement of lesser rights such as
sovereignty.
The assumption of a unity of interests between the individual and the
collective provides another similarity between Soviet justification for in-
ternational intervention and Soviet municipal law. Theoretically, a unity
of interests prevails within the socialist commonwealth, which renders
the distinction between national and international interests irrelevant. 79
From this point of view, "intervention" in Czechoslovakia was a united
effort by fraternal socialist countries to defeat anti-socialist forces. 80 Just
as a socialist state embodies the will of all its members, thereby preempt-
ing the possibility of conflicts between citizen and state, the socialist com-
monwealth does not deviate from the collective interest of its members.
76. Harold Berman suggests that traditional Russian attitudes toward law, and not the
influence of Marxism, may explain the Soviet system's subordination of individual rights to
collective interests. He claims that the doctrines of the Russian Orthodox church are partly
responsible for this attitude: "Soviet conceptions of crime and the criminal have deep roots in
the Russian orthodox conception of the corporate character of sin.... Such a conception has
nonlegal and even antilegal implications." H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR 248 (1963).
77. Kovalev, supra note 28, at 10.
78. Brezhnev, Address to the Polish United Workers' Party, Pravda, Nov. 13, 1968, 20
CDSP No. 46, at 4.
79. "The Sovereignty of individual socialist countries cannot be counterposed to the inter-
ests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement." Kovalev, supra note 28, at
11.




The leadership role played by the CPSU is a third element that social-
ist internationalism shares with the Soviet domestic legal system. Do-
mestically, the Party's role has a constitutional sanction which it
reinforces by placing its members at strategic points in the judicial sys-
tem. The Soviet Union's role as leader of the socialist commonwealth,
81
however, is not accorded the same legitimacy that the CPSU enjoys at
home despite attempts by the Soviets to formalize their leadership status
at conferences of socialist countries.8 2 In practice, though, there is no
doubt that within the socialist commonwealth the CPSU has the preroga-
tive to pass judgment on questions requiring the application of socialist
internationalism and the power to impose sanctions to enforce its
decisions.
Beginning with the proposition that the international norms governing
intervention have a basis in domestic laws regulating individual rights, I
have tried to trace the doctrine of socialist internationalism back to So-
viet domestic law and Marxist ethics. Viewed from this perspective, the
rules of socialist international law can be explained by the dual role of
Soviet law as a social stabilizer and a tool for policy implementation.
Just as Soviet domestic law resembles its Western counterparts in many
matters relevant to governing a society, the Soviets recognize peaceful
coexistence as functional international law governing relations between
socialist and non-socialist states, while paying rhetorical homage to con-
tinuing the conflict through non-violent means. However, in the Soviet
view, peaceful coexistence must not interfere with obedience to the
Marxist laws of history which legitimate Soviet rule and define its mis-
sion, including the goal of socialist internationalism.
The domestic analogy thus does not lead to a conclusive judgment re-
garding the propriety of intervention in international law. The Walzer-
natural law model starts from the assumption that individuals have ina-
lienable rights from which states derive rights, including the right to
81. Given the word's associations with the British Commonwealth, which was character-
ized by the strong leadership of one state, Soviet use of "commonwealth" for this group of
countries is ironic.
82. The 1957 Declaration of the Twelve Communist Parties in Power described the Soviet
Union as "the first and mightiest socialist power" and the bloc as a whole is called the "indivis-
ible camp of Socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union." Declaration of the Twelve Com-
munist Parties in Power, Nov. 1957, reprinted in THE NEW COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 169,
174, 173 (D. Jacobs ed. 1962). The Bratislava Statement, a communique issued by six mem-
bers of the Warsaw Pact two weeks before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, is less force-
ful, merely singling out the Soviet Union for achieving "especially great successes in the
construction of socialism and communism." Conference of Central Committee of Communist
and Workers' Parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, G.D.R., Hungary, Poland, and U.S.S.R.,
Aug. 3, 1968, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1280 (1968) [hereinafter Bratislava Statement]. This indi-
cates that the Soviet Union has significant influence in determining the "legislative" pro-
nouncements made by socialist international organizations.
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sovereignty. In contrast, the Soviet-Marxist model couples "instrumen-
talist ethics"8 3 with a rejection of natural law to produce a system of
domestic law that freely subordinates individual rights to the collective
goal of historical progress. Consciously or not, this framework for rights
has been appropriated by Soviet international law, under which the right
of state sovereignty ends where the interests of world socialism begin.
The Soviet example suggests that the intuitive appeal of Walzer's legal-
ist paradigm depends more on a presumption of shared values based on
natural law than on the logic of the domestic analogy. As transposed by
the domestic analogy to the level of inter-state law, the doctrine of social-
ist internationalism is entirely consistent with Soviet ethics and domestic
law even as it conflicts with the professed international law goal of pro-
tecting state sovereignty. Thus, Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia
and Hungary had a theoretical basis logically, though not morally, expli-
cable by reference to Soviet domestic law and principles of Marxism.8 4
III. "New Thinking" and Socialist Internationalism
This section analyzes recent developments in Soviet foreign policy and
Soviet international law scholarship for indications of a change in Soviet
behavior or a resolution of the legal conflicts between socialist interna-
tionalism and current standards of Western international law regarding
the use of force as embodied in the U.N. Charter." In the past, the
Soviets defended socialist internationalism as constituting a legitimate
sub-system of general international law. Recent statements by General
83. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
84. The application of these principles to the international arena runs counter to Western
international law, which in this century has sought to ban uses of force by strengthening re-
spect for state sovereignty.
85. The U.N. Charter is an appropriate standard against which to evaluate socialist inter-
nationalism's justification for using force since the Charter attempts to codify the natural law
norms, which are the basis of the legalist paradigm, by divorcing uses of force from ideological
objectives. As Professor Kahn notes, "The Charter was founded on the historically new idea
that ideology could no longer safely employ violence, that future ideological battles must be
fought with other weapons." Kahn, supra note 34, at 60. Although this new conception has
not resulted in the actual elimination of uses of force for ideological purposes, it has delegi-
timized them to the extent that states have consistently tried to portray uses of force as being
in accord with the spirit of the U.N. Charter. At worst, one could dismiss these often con-
torted justifications as vice cynically paying tribute to virtue through hypocrisy; at best, state
actions of questionable legality and subsequent illogical justifications could be optimistically
regarded as sincere misapplications and misinterpretations of laws still in their infancy that
lack competent institutions of interpretation and enforcement. The actual influence of interna-
tional law on state uses of force probably fluctuates between these views. Even at the cynical
end of the spectrum, law's veneer-however thin or cracked--does cover state actions.
Although not observed scrupulously, the Charter's rules governing the use of force have been
approved by all Member states and, at a minimum, a stigma of criminality attaches to states
that would violate them. See Schacter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MicH. L,




Secretary Gorbachev and Soviet international law jurists, however, imply
that the Soviet Union's pluralist conception of international law (which
divides international law into norms of peaceful coexistence and socialist
internationalism) may yield to a single set of norms based upon the U.N.
Charter that will govern the Soviet Union's relations with both capitalist
and socialist countries.
The traditional Soviet model of intervention, in stark contrast to the
U.N. Charter's prohibition on uses of force, condones intervention as a
means of defending the gains of socialism. The Soviet model challenges
accepted Western standards of state sovereignty in that it values commu-
nity uniformity over individual autonomy.86 In the absence of U.N.
86. A tension between the sovereign state system and competing objectives of international
society exists within Western international law as well. Most importantly, the aspirations of
achieving self-determination and human rights everywhere in the world have been advanced as
justifying uses of force at the expense of state sovereignty. The human rights challenge denies
a priori respect for sovereignty because sovereignty sanctions abuses of human rights by illegit-
imate regimes. Luban writes that "the concept of sovereignty is morally flaccid, not because it
applies to illegitimate regimes, but because it is insensitive to the entire dimension of legiti-
macy." Luban, Just War and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 195, 201 (1985).
He adds, "The violence of modern nationalism and its indifference to basic human rights
arises, I believe, from the conviction that the only right which matters politically is the right to
a unified nation state." Luban, The Romance of the Nation-State, in id. at 239. This evolu-
tionary trend in Western international law, grounded in concern for human rights, rejects the
rigid use of the domestic analogy in favor of a pragmatic application of natural law rights
directly to people rather than to states allegedly responsible for human rights. This model thus
sets a much lower threshold for legitimate intervention for the protection of human rights than
Walzer's legalist paradigm.
Yet another Western justification advanced to legitimize intervention is the pursuit of civil
or political rights, most notably the right of self-determination. "Though all interventions are
lamentable," Reisman writes, "the fact is that some may serve, in terms of aggregate conse-
quences, to increase the probability of the free choice of peoples about their government and
political structure." Reisman, Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International
Law, in AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW: PROCEEDINGS 74, 85 (1984). This doctrine would raise
the status of desirable political norms like self-determination to a level above state sovereignty,
and is one of the more radical calls for using international law to pursue goals of justice at the
expense of international stability. As such, it has aroused considerable criticism and little
consent. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 409 (Judgment of June 27, 1986) (Schwebel, J., dissenting; emphasis in original) at
para. 180:
In contemporary international law, the right of self determination, freedom and indepen-
dence of peoples is universally recognized; the right of peoples to struggle to achieve these
ends is universally accepted; but what is not universally recognized and what is not uni-
versally accepted is any right of such peoples to foreign assistance or support which con-
stitutes intervention.
In contrast to the human rights challenge, Walzer's legalist paradigm, with some exceptions,
see, e.g., M. WALZER, supra note 34, at 85, 90, 108, 121, links human rights with state sover-
eignty. States, he argues, are the best arenas for people to realize human and political rights
and sovereignty should be zealously protected accordingly. Walzer notes, "We need to estab-
lish a kind of a priori respect for state boundaries; they are... the only boundaries communi-
ties ever have." Id. at 85, 90. Walzer does, however, allow for some uses of force against
states to remedy a situation in which the illegitimacy of the government is "radically appar-
ent." In Walzer's view, interventions are justified to the extent that they restore "communal
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principles legitimating intervention to fulfill duties of fraternal assistance,
the Soviets have traditionally claimed that legal relations between social-
ist countries form an independent system of international law based on
progressive class relations. Fourteen years ago, Tunkin noted, "To assert
that relations between socialist countries should be regulated only by
principles of general international law is to deny the different class char-
acter of relations between the countries of socialism, to be derailed from
party principle into the morass of bourgeois normativism.
' '87
The Soviet Union justified the use of force against the sovereignty of
Hungary and Czechoslovakia by pointing to socialist internationalism's
doctrine of fraternal mutual assistance. The two major conventional
agreements organizing the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the
Warsaw Pact and the Charter of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA), both prominently incorporate declarations of alle-
giance to the principles of socialist internationalism, mentioning fraternal
assistance in each case. Through these multilateral treaties, the Soviets
claim to have created their own sub-system of international law; thus,
according to the maxim lex specialis derogat legis generalis, relations be-
tween socialist states are governed primarily by socialist internationalism
rather than general international law.88
The Soviet claim, however, cannot sustain itself in light of the Soviet
commitment to the U.N. system. That commitment includes the follow-
ing pledge: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obli-
gations under any other international agreement, their obligations under
the present Charter shall prevail." 89  Combining this international
supremacy clause with Article 2(4) effectively prohibits all uses of force
inconsistent with the principles of the United Nations. Thus, the Soviet
pledge at Bratislava to participate in obligations to defend the gains of
socialism 90 cannot legally be carried out through the use of force.
General Secretary Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign policy,91
some of which has influenced Soviet international law doctrine, is
autonomy" because states protect the "conceptions of life and liberty that underlie the [legal-
ist] paradigm and make it plausible." Id. at 86.
87. G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 446 (1974).
88. Tunkin, supra note 5, at 110.
89. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
90. Bratislava Statement, supra note 82.
91. See Gorbachev, October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues, Pravda, Nov.
3, 1987, 39 CDSP, No. 45, at 16. Gorbachev defines his new approach to foreign policy pri-
madly as a new process of looking at the world rather than as a static set of answers to interna-
tional problems. M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA 151 (1987) ("We do not consider new




designed to repudiate certain elements of the Brezhnev Doctrine, includ-
ing the requirement that all socialist countries follow the same path of
economic and political development. 92 Gorbachev's policies raise inter-
esting questions about the future of socialist internationalism as the oper-
ative set of norms governing relations among socialist countries. The
Soviet Union's rejection of natural law and the socialist domestic analogy
underlying socialist internationalism, however, suggest that socialist in-
ternationalism will not fade away rapidly.
The most visible intimation of a change in the Soviet doctrine of social-
ist internationalism appeared in Gorbachev's November 1987 speech to
the Central Committee honoring the 70th anniversary of the Russian
Revolution. 93 In an extended discussion of relations among socialist
countries, Gorbachev emphasized the principle of sovereign equality
94
and actually suggested a convergence between the doctrines of peaceful
coexistence and socialist internationalism:
Accumulated experience makes it possible to do a better job of building
relations among socialist countries on generally recognized principles.
These principles include unconditional and complete equality. They in-
clude the responsibility of the ruling party for affairs in its state, and patri-
otic service to its people. They include respect for one another, a serious
attitude toward what has been achieved and tested by one's friends, and
voluntary, diversified cooperation. They include strict observance of all the
principles of peaceful coexistence. The practice of socialist internationalism
is grounded in these principles.
95
If the Soviets in fact intend to adhere to the principles of peaceful coexis-
tence rather than socialist internationalism in relations with socialist
cooperation through the United Nations, Gorbachev has also stressed the common destinies of
Eastern and Western Europe through the concept of the "common European house." In U.S.-
Soviet relations, Gorbachev has altered the policies of his predecessors by underscoring the
mutual interdependence of American and Soviet security concerns. "'We can never be secure
so long as the United States feels itself insecure.'" Shulman, The Superpowers: Dance of the
Dinosaurs, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 494, 502 (1988) (quoting Gorbachev).
92. In 1968, Brezhnev declared that the fraternal socialist countries must follow a uniform
path to development: "[I]t is well known comrades that there are common natural laws of
socialist construction, deviation from which could lead to deviation from socialism as such."
Brezhnev, Address to Polish United Workers Party, Pravda, Nov. 13, 1968, 22 CDSP, No. 46,
at 4.
93. Gorbachev, supra note 91.
94. Although socialist internationalism includes the rights of sovereignty and equality, the
Soviet Union traditionally treats these norms as subordinate to the interests of the socialist
movement. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. Gorbachev hints at a change in the
Soviet attitude by stressing the diversity within the socialist movement: "We have become
convinced that unity does not at all mean identity and uniformity. We have also become
convinced that socialism does not and cannot have any 'model' that everyone must measure up
to." Gorbachev, supra note 91, at 16.
95. Id.
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states, this implies a renunciation of fraternal assistance, the doctrine by
which the Soviets have justified intervention in Eastern Europe. Such a
Soviet reorientation to peaceful coexistence would indicate the end of the
socialist domestic analogy since peaceful coexistence is not designed to
protect the socialist system in the same manner as socialist international-
ism. Instead, peaceful coexistence is essentially a reiteration of basic
U.N. principles like non-use of force, non-interference, and respect for
state sovereignty and territorial integrity.96 As observed earlier, this doc-
trine evolved as a means of governing the relations and competition be-
tween states with opposed socio-economic systems, as reflected in its calls
for deference to the independence of states to determine their form of
government. In the realm of international law, Gorbachev's "new think-
ing" seeks to elevate peaceful coexistence to a universal norm.97 Since
the norms of peaceful coexistence and the principles of the U.N. Charter
are intimately connected in Soviet international law theory, 98 the objec-
tive of universalizing peaceful coexistence could be interpreted as a
change in Soviet attitudes toward the United Nations.99
In fact, Soviet enthusiasm for the United Nations has increased in re-
cent years. In a speech prior to the start of the 42nd session of the U.N.
General Assembly, Gorbachev expressed the Soviet objective of strength-
ening the role of the U.N. Security Council in conformity with chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. 100 Chapter VII empowers the Security Council
to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken ... to maintain or restore international
peace and security." 10 1 Perhaps to demonstrate the sincerity of their
commitment to the Security Council, the Soviets agreed to pay the
United Nations over $200 million in arrears, including unpaid contribu-
tions for U.N. peace-keeping operations that the Soviets had previously
opposed.102 Gorbachev has also signaled a Soviet willingness to accept
96. The current definition of peaceful coexistence is unchanged from the doctrine
enunciated by Tunkin in the 1970s. In addition to the legal norms mentioned, "[i]t presup-
poses the establishment of an international order dominated by good neighborliness and coop-
eration and not by force, with extensive exchanges of scientific and technological achievements
and cultural values for the good of all nations." Yermoshkin, supra note 26, at 75.
97. I. Lukashuk, 70-letie Oktiabria i mezhdunarodnoe pravo, Sov. Gos. & PRAVO, Nov.
1987, at 57, 60.
98. See Tunkin, supra note 27.
99. Gorbachev has pledged to strengthen the authority of the United Nations, which he
described as "a universal mechanism which can.., ensure the collective search for a balance
of the interests of all governments." Gorbachev, supra note 91.
100. Gorbachev, Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World, INT'L AFF., Nov. 1987, at 10.
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.




the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, pro-
vided other members of the Security Council reciprocate. 0 3 An earnest
commitment to these U.N. enforcement mechanisms would require the
Soviets to pay greater respect to the U.N. Charter's norms governing the
use of force. Stricter Soviet adherence to the U.N. Charter would limit
the nation's flexibility under socialist internationalism; the U.N. system
is designed to remove decisions on the use of force from individual states,
instead making them subject to collective deliberation and action.
In addition to Gorbachev's comments, Soviet international law schol-
ars have devoted considerable attention in the last year to studying the
United Nations, including its significance in governing uses of force and
its procedural mechanisms for achieving these normative objectives.
1°4
One author, Movchan, for example, stresses the importance of Article
103, which binds all members of the United Nations to respect their obli-
gations to the Charter above all other commitments. Article 103,
Movchan writes, "was given serious attention during the creation of the
U.N.; the principles of the U.N. Charter have indeed become immutable
juridical rules to which all governments without exception must strictly
adhere."10 5 Soviet jurists are also exhibiting a new interest in chapter
VII and the activist role it designates for the Security Council.106 Soviet
scholar Skakunov has linked Gorbachev's call for greater adherence to
U.N. procedural instruments for conflict resolution with the objective of
widening the application of the principle of peaceful coexistence.'
0 7
These Soviet views, supporting the supremacy and universality of the
U.N. Charter and by implication its principal role in adjudicating all uses
of force, undercut the claim made earlier by Tunkin that socialist inter-
nationalism is a legitimate sub-system of international law.
Despite these writings, as well as Gorbachev's comments and the con-
tinuing Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, it is premature to conclude
103. Gorbachev, supra note 100 at 10.
104. Tunkin, for example, writes that Soviet theorists are unanimous in believing in the
binding character of Article 2(4). He notes that the Soviet view on this question is in complete
accord with Western scholars such as Henkin. Tunkin, Printsip neprimeneniia sily v sovremen-
nuiu epokhu, Soy. Gos. & PRAVO, Sept. 1987, at 98, 103, 105.
105. Movchan, Ukreplenie mezhdunarodnogo pravoporiadka-kurs KPSS i Sovetskogo
gosudarstva, Sov. Gos. & PRAvo, June 1986, at 88.
106. For example, on September 23, 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated:
We believe that the United Nations should again take the matter of Middle East settle-
ment into its hands. As a practical step in that direction, the Soviet Union proposes that a
preparatory committee be set up within the framework of the Security Council to do the
necessary work for convening an international conference on the Middle East.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1986, at A10, col. 1.
107. Skakunov, Bseob"emliushchaia bezopastnost.: model' perestroika mezhdunarodnikh
otnoshenil, Sov. Gos. & PR~vo, May 1987, at 105.
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that the Soviets are in the process of abandoning socialist international-
ism in favor of a total commitment to the United Nations. A number of
factors counsel a cautious reaction to the evident Soviet revision of so-
cialist internationalism. First, the doctrine still exists in the bilateral and
multilateral treaties in force between the Soviet Union and the socialist
countries of Eastern Europe. 0 8 The continuation of agreements like the
CMEA and the Warsaw Pact in their present forms implies that the so-
cialist domestic analogy, which determines how the Soviets perceive of
and justify the use of force, remains intact. While Gorbachev's policies
have fueled hope that Eastern European nations may enjoy greater inde-
pendence from their fraternal ally, 10 9 one should question the prospects
for change while the legal foundations of the status quo in Eastern Eu-
rope remain unaltered.
A second ground for skepticism is that Soviet jurists have not publicly
discussed the consequences of applying peaceful coexistence and the
U.N. Charter universally, nor have they openly repudiated the elements
of socialist internationalism that conflict with peaceful coexistence. In
fact, with the exception of Gorbachev's pronouncement-which itself
was ambiguous-the scholarly articles on peaceful coexistence and the
United Nations have not confronted the issue of how "new thinking" in
international law would affect the legal relationships among socialist
countries. There may be resistance among Soviet scholars to jettisoning
the pluralist conception of international law. Levin, an elder statesman
of Soviet international law, in a recent article summarizing the develop-
ment of Soviet conceptions of international law makes clear that he still
regards the principles of socialist internationalism as governing the rela-
tions between socialist countries.' 1 Skakunov argues that the restructur-
ing (perestroika) of international relations along the lines proposed by
Gorbachev has both regional and universal consequences, but he does
not specify precisely what these consequences are or how they differ."'
This questioning by Soviet scholars may indicate that the jury is still out
on whether, as Gorbachev claims, socialist internationalism is grounded
in the principles of peaceful coexistence or still stands as an independent
doctrine.
108. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
109. See, eg. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1987, at A7, col. 1, decribing a clash between East
German youths and police in which the demonstrators chanted "Gorbachevl Gorbachev]" in
addition to "The wall must go!"
110. Levin, Razvitie sovetskoi kontseptsii po voprosy o sushchnosti mezhdunarodogo pravo,
Sov. Gos. & PRAVO, June 1986, at 96.




A third factor revolves around the Soviet commitment to Marxism,
which it professes to be unshakable. As demonstrated above, socialist
internationalism has strong ties to Marxist-Soviet ethics. To the extent
that one accepts the Soviet Constitution's goal of building communism in
the Soviet Union and abroad, the doctrine of socialist internationalism
would seem to serve that objective particularly well. In other words,
while fraternal assistance is surely an affront to the U.N. principles gov-
erning the use of force, the converse is true as well: the U.N. Charter
system, with its deference to state sovereignty, contradicts the Marxist
idea that nation-states hinder human development. By recognizing the
state-centered U.N. norms as the code of conduct in socialist relations,
the Soviets would commit the sin of employing "an abstract, non-class
approach to questions of sovereignty and self-determination" of which
Kovalev accused bourgeois critics twenty years ago.
112
An examination of the theoretical (and perhaps practical) implications
of the choice between peaceful coexistence and socialist internationalism
reveals that more is at stake than terminology. If the Soviets decide to
conduct all relations on the basis of the Western domestic analogy as
embodied in the U.N. Charter and respect the rights of Eastern Euro-
pean countries to evolve independently according to Western definitions
of self-determination, they would be revising a code of international law
based on the Marxist domestic analogy that justifies intervention in de-
fense of the collective interests of the socialist commonwealth. This
would not constitute the first contradiction between Marxist theoria and
Soviet praxis. It is essential for us, as observers of Soviet foreign policy,
to consider seriously apparently semantic changes in Soviet international
law doctrine because, in the words of Tunkin, "[iln the process of creat-
ing new norms or changing existing norms of international law, every
government strives to assure that the new norms will reflect, to the fullest
possible extent, the principles of its foreign policy. ' 113 A change in So-
viet international law doctrine regarding the socialist internationalist
norms governing relations with Eastern Europe would represent a
profound shift in Soviet foreign policy.
1 14
Conclusion
I have attempted to examine socialist internationalism by returning to
its philosophical antecedents-Soviet domestic law and Marxist theory-
112. Kovalev, supra note 28, at 10.
113. Tunkin, supra note 27, at 100.
114. See Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in Con-
temporary International Law and Practice, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 171, 197-98 (1988).
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and to review its content using the language and logic that produced it. I
do not suggest that the Soviets scrupulously adhere to their own theoreti-
cal conception of international law nor that Soviet behavior is any more
or less ideologically motivated than that of other countries. My intention
is to demonstrate that although Soviet actions often violate Western con-
ceptions of international law, the Soviets look to other, non-Western
norms of international conduct. In place of the Western deontological
approach to international law in which states have a priori rights, social-
ist legal theory circumscribes states' rights with the socialist theory of
history which embodies the logic of material progress. This worldview
promises the ultimate demise of nation states. In practice, this theory
predicts the inevitability of a Pax Sovieticus in which the lexicon of
"commonwealth" will truly apply to the federation of socialist countries.
Under this arrangement the legal regime would best be described in con-
stitutional,115 rather than international law, terms.' 16 Beyond the evi-
dent political and historical factors influencing the rise (and possible fall)
of socialist internationalism, the principle of limited sovereignty should
be viewed as a compromise that recognizes the resiliency of the nation-
state construct and the professed ideological consensus within the social-
ist bloc regarding the international imperative of abolishing mankind's
contrived divisions.
Gorbachev's new foreign policy and recent Soviet international law
scholarship suggest that Soviet perceptions of socialist international law
are evolving to allow for greater tolerance of diverse strains of socialism.
However, if the domestic analogy in fact accurately captures how socie-
ties conceive of international law, the Soviet rejection of natural law indi-
cates that protection of socialism may continue to receive a higher
priority than state sovereignty. Intervention sanctioned by socialist in-
ternationalism has strong roots in Marxist doctrine and in the norms of
Soviet domestic law. Thus, while Gorbachev's recent statements, as well
115. V. KUBLKOVA & A. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 10, at 190.
116. In reality, though, the socialist promise of transcending divisive patterns of human
behavior, such as nationalism, appears to be as distant now as in 1917. Within the Warsaw
Pact, the Soviet Union, and even the Russian Republic, the embers of national chauvinism
burn continually and sparks of ethnic hatred periodically ignite. The persistent appeal of na-
tionalism suggests that Marxist theory profoundly misjudged the potential for economic class
rather than the "imagined communities" of nation states to constitute the basis of human self-
definition. See B. ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983). As Anderson notes, "The
reality is quite plain: the 'end of the era of nationalism,' so long prophesied, is not remotely in
sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our
time." Id. at 12. Whether or not nations are inevitable by nature, or desirable, as Walzer
argues, the state as a political, linguistic, and psychological construct thus far appears impervi-
ous to the model of history postulated by Marx. See id.; J. TALMON, THE MYTH OF THE




as the writings of Soviet theorists, suggest a new direction in Soviet con-
ceptions of international law, they should not be considered as necessar-
ily leading to a wholesale change in Soviet attitude toward its socialist
neighbors. It is too early to determine the extent to which the "new"
foreign policy will move away from the Soviet Union's traditional em-
phasis on socialist internationalism.
